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Philip Schlesinger 
 
Published in Screen 2007 
 
Introduction 
This is a short report on work in progress. It centres on the idea of ‘creativity’, which is 
of presently of key importance for current UK government thinking about the ‘creative 
economy’. ‘Creativity’, I shall argue, has established itself as a hegemonic term in an 
increasingly elaborated framework of policy ideas. Although my focus is on the UK, we 
are addressing a body of thought that is now increasingly international in scope.  
 
The ideas in question are influential and set the terms for thought and action across a 
number of policy fields. Not for nothing has David Puttnam, a key ‘New’ Labour figure, 
said that ‘the importance of the creative industries was quickly enshrined as an article of 
faith’.ii An analysis of New Labour discourse reveals an underlying credo – itself a fit 
subject for the critique of ideology. A concerted effort is under way to shape a wide range 
of working practices by invoking creativity and innovation. These attributes are supposed 
to make our societies and economies grow in a fiercely competitive world. 
 
At present, official thinking circulates in a dominant culture of largely uncritical 
acceptance. Alongside the elaboration of the doctrine of creativity by the government 
policy apparatus is a specialist discourse of academic analysis. If it is now fashionable to 
see the creative economy as pivotal to the wider economy, this view is certainly not 
limited to policy makers.iii
 
As creativity has moved centre stage, it has also become extraordinarily banal. The mark 
of its present hegemony is that it is also increasingly ubiquitous. ‘British creativity’, for 
instance, ensures market success for Thornton’s, the chocolate manufacturers, so their 
advertising tells us. Not on its own, to be sure: cocoa and sugar are added ingredients. In 
a district nearby to mine in Glasgow, there is a ‘creative hairdresser’. We who stay 
without must ponder what wondrous transformations occur under the stylists’ hands. My 
inbox is regularly assaulted by spam offering courses to explore my creativity (and 
temptingly, to develop my ludic qualities) in New York City and various European 
locations. So far I have managed to resist. Such examples could easily be multiplied.  
 
The creative economy as a discourse 
In the UK, the discourse of creativity has been developed by government for the past 
decade and is currently being bound into a conception of the ‘creative economy’. Official 
thinking is a discourse in the sense that it is a self-sustaining outlook increasingly driven 
towards consistency. It has become a doctrine by virtue of being an object of unceasing 
advocacy by its proponents. It is now an obligatory starting-point for those who wish to 
enter into dialogue with policy-makers.  
 
In an astute analysis of ‘New’ Labour’s political language, Norman Fairclough has 
demonstrated how it embodies a particular worldview, linking ‘assumptions about the 
global economy that lead to an emphasis on competition between Britain and other 
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countries, which foregrounds a project of “national renewal” designed to improve 
Britain’s competitive position’. ‘Creativity’ – like ‘knowledge’, ‘skills’ and ‘enterprise’ – 
have been key tropes from the start.iv
 
Although the formal beginning was marked by the installation of Tony Blair’s ‘New’ 
Labour government of May 1997 – much of the ground was prepared well in advance. 
 
As Jim McGuigan has noted, there were two dimensions to the incoming Labour 
government’s approach to cultural policy.v One was symbolic – a projection of a new 
mood but in reality a kind of regressive modernisation whose key symbol (until it became 
manifestly absurd and discredited) was the Millennium Dome at Greenwich.vi This 
aspect, associated with marketing and public relations, treated the nation as though it 
were a brand. The other face was that of ‘cultural policy proper’, which promoted 
creative industries not only as an assertion of national identity but also as a key form of 
economic competition. In part, these ideas reflected an earlier phase of Labour Party 
thinking, which had taken ‘cultural industries’ to be a central instrument of economic and 
urban regeneration - a line to some extent also pursued by the Conservative Party.vii It 
was at this moment that tropes were coined that - with minor modifications – have 
survived for a decade of Labour rule. For instance, the idea of the UK as a ‘creative hub’ 
for the whole world economy is still very much in play.  
 
Nicholas Garnham has argued that Labour Party policy was deeply influenced by the 
Thatcherism that preceded it.viii He also sees creative industries policy as an outcome of 
earlier ‘information society’ thinking and has suggested that arguments about 
international competitiveness and deregulation characteristic of the Thatcher period have 
been carried through from the 1980s to the present day.  
 
New Labour made the creative industries part of their pre-election economic strategy in 
the run-up to the May 1997 general election. What was then labelled the ‘cultural 
economy’ was seen as a key and growing segment of the national economy and as 
offering comparative advantage. In the earlier idiom, the ‘cultural industries’ were touted 
as offering a ‘creative base’ for the UK. This transitional period foreshadowed the 
melding of these ideas into ‘creative industries’. The range of activities then identified as 
relevant was to be formalised by what came later - the ‘mapping’ of the creative 
industries.  
 
After the 1997 election, the UK government set up the Creative Industries Task Force. It 
was intended to secure collaboration between government and industry, thereby 
producing a context for sustainable growth in the newly designated creative industries.ix 
The Creative Industries Mapping Document was published in 1998.x In a formulation 
that has lasted a decade (and, as we shall see, only now being openly rethought) creative 
industries were defined as ‘those activities which have their origin in individual 
creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation though 
the generation and exploitation of intellectual property’.xi The text went on: 
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‘These have been taken to include the following key sectors: advertising, architecture, the 
art and antiques market, crafts, design, designer fashion, film, interactive leisure 
software, music, the performing arts, publishing, software and television and radio.’ 
 
The core purpose of the Task Force was ‘to recommend steps to maximise the economic 
impact of the UK creative industries at home and abroad’.xii The logic of economic policy 
has prevailed. 
 
The pursuit of a creativity policy became a national project, ‘branding’ the UK as at the 
global cutting-edge. Two key policy nostrums have been continuously in play. First, the 
UK is imagined as a competitive nation for which developing a ‘knowledge economy’ is 
key. This line has become particularly emphatic with the realisation that the BRIC 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), present an increasing threat to high-end 
‘creative’ activities. Education and training therefore become key policy arenas. Second, 
government intervention in the market, and also in establishing conditions favourable to 
enhancing company performance, is justified as helping to secure the knowledge base. 
Increasingly, the elaboration of a policy framework to enhance the performance of the 
creative industries is leaching into other sectors, as ‘creativity’ becomes a generalised 
value in itself.  
 
Official reports: elaboration of a doctrine 
‘Creative industries’ discourse has been shaped gradually into a doctrine. Although there 
has been a division of labour between several departments of the UK state over the 
creative economy, there is increasing consistency in the elaboration of ideas and 
arguments, as well as extensive cross-referencing between reports currently being 
published. This process accord with Fairclough’s observation that the New Labour 
project ‘is constantly talked into being, new language is constantly being found to bring 
these elements into a coherent whole’.xiii
 
The key ministries have been the Treasury, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), 
the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) and the Department for Education 
and Skills (DfES). The Treasury is the UK government’s key spending department. For a 
decade, its direction was in the hand of Gordon Brown as Chancellor of the Exchequer; 
he subsequently succeeded Tony Blair as Labour Prime Minister in June 2007. Garnham 
has noted the importance of ‘so-called “endogenous growth” theory which attributed the 
relative international competitiveness of nations and industries to the institutional 
structures supporting innovation, part of which was the provision of suitably trained 
human capital’. This has been Brown’s approach. xiv
 
Surrounding – and in this case supporting and legitimising - the efforts of government is 
a wider apparatus of ‘governance’. As Jean-Gustave Padioleau (2003: 183-184) has 
argued, this is the space in which the so-called policy community deploys arguments and 
makes interventions, entering the game of influence through the production of reports, the 
setting up of committees, contributing to the media agenda, and so forth.xv This is the 
terrain of what Padioleau calls the ‘practical arts’, where the meanings produced for 
public consumption are meant to be common, accessible, transmissible, and able both to 
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guide and constrain conduct. It is a world in which the formula prevails. Those 
conscripted into the policy intelligentsia don’t simply air opinions but provide evidence 
that aims to convince and seek to install a new architecture for public action.xvi The 
production of the discourse of creativity fits into this analytical model. In what follows, I 
briefly consider three cases. 
 
Re-engineering businesses 
It was no accident that Chancellor Brown commissioned The Cox Review, published on 2 
December 2005. In his foreword, Sir George Cox, chairman of the Design Council, states 
that the key issue for ‘the UK’s long-term economic success’ is ‘how to exploit the 
nation’s creative skills more fully’.xvii The Review was shaped by an awareness of the 
competitive standing of the ‘emerging economies’, reflecting another spin of the 
creativity wheel eight years on from its first public outing.  
 
Cox identified two key areas: ‘building a strong relationship between businesses and 
creative professionals, and strengthening the links across university departments and with 
industries’. He focused on small to medium enterprises (SMEs) ‘which account for 50 per 
cent of UK gross domestic product (GDP) and provide much of its entrepreneurial 
base’.xviii The Review recommended extensive consciousness raising in the boardroom, 
more networking between diverse sectors, establishing links between universities and 
SMEs, and also using the media to develop a general awareness of the benefits of 
creativity and university degree courses to produce new creative specialists. 
 
The Cox Review is unusually clear in its attempt to define the dominant terminology: 
 
‘“Creativity” is the generation of new ideas - either new ways of looking at existing 
problems, or of seeing new opportunities, perhaps by exploiting emerging technologies or 
changes in markets. 
 
“Innovation” is the successful exploitation of new ideas. It is the process that carries 
them through to new products, new services, new ways of running the business or even 
new ways of doing business. 
 
“Design” is what links creativity and innovation. It shapes ideas to become practical and 
attractive propositions for users or customers. Design may be described as creativity 
deployed to a specific end.’xix    
 
This conceptual architecture sets out idealised relations between ideas, their exploitation 
and business practice. Whether this is how things work in practice is a matter for 
empirical investigation. The slogan about innovation as ‘the successful exploitation of 
ideas’ has become the mantra of the Office of Science and Innovation in the DTI whence, 
I was told, it apparently migrated via the recruitment of senior staff from the global 
design and business consulting firm, Ove Arup. 
 
Cox’s Review is intended as a wake-up call: the UK will not necessarily retain its 
competitive advantage as an advanced economy when an emerging world is catching up 
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and even overtaking the country in the service industries. The UK’s strengths in scientific 
invention and the creative industries are not being carried through ‘into consistently 
world-beating products and services’ because of a lack of awareness, confidence, 
ambition, risk-taking and clarity.xx Public action is needed, such as new programmes, 
incentives for R&D, the formation of specialists, and the use of procurement and 
networking.xxi
 
The Cox Review’s discourse combines: 
 
- an economic nationalism that recognises certain cultural virtues (considered here as 
creative capabilities) as key to competition on the world stage; however, this is not a 
simple essentialist nationalist hurrah as ‘it’s dangerously complacent to think that the 
UK’s creative capabilities are simply an enduring national characteristic’;xxii
 
- a conception of the state and its various agencies as enablers in creating a business 
climate conducive to greater competitiveness;  
 
- a commitment to creativity as a fundamental attribute that requires the nation to undergo 
widespread ‘cultural change’ across the fields of production and consumption;xxiii
 
- a particular vision of an ‘enterprise economy’ where creativity becomes a general 
feature of economic life, as summed up in the mantra: ‘Creative businesses are creative 
throughout.’ xxiv
 
Making education ‘creative’ 
Cox’s advocacy of cultural change in business has been linked to current official thinking 
about education, as is shown by my second example. 
 
All Our futures was published in September 1999 by the National Advisory Committee 
on Creative and Cultural Education.xxv Chaired by Professor Ken Robinson of Warwick 
University, one of the UK’s home-grown creativity gurus, the report was commissioned 
by the Department for Education and Employment  (DfEE) and the DCMS. The DCMS’s 
then Secretary of State was Chris Smith, an early advocate of the idea of a ‘creative 
Britain’.xxvi The committee’s membership comprised educationists, artists, scientists and 
business people. Focused on provision for under-16s in formal and informal education, 
the report responded to policy-makers’ wish to ‘develop “human resources”, and in 
particular to promote creativity, adaptability and better powers of communication’.xxvii 
Robinson and his committee defined creativity as ‘Imaginative activity fashioned so as to 
produce outcomes that are both original and of value.’xxviii  A ‘creative education’ is 
therefore intended to develop ‘young people’s capacities for original ideas and action’.xxix
 
According to All Our Futures, ‘All people have creative abilities and we all have them 
differently. When individuals find their creative strengths, it can have an enormous 
impact on self-esteem and on overall achievement’. Robinson’s report focuses on 
bringing out the potential that lies within us all. Creativity is not to be identified solely 
with the arts or the achievements of elites and the gifted. Instead, ‘all people are capable 
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of creative achievement in some area of activity’. This is Robinson’s ‘democratic 
definition’, which sidesteps the question of socially structured inequality. xxx
 
There is a clear affinity between the notion that all are possessed of creativity and the 
idea that in businesses all personnel should be creative or, at the very least, support the 
creative endeavour of those specifically designated as ‘creatives’. In All Our Futures, the 
demands of the job market are fully in mind. In the ‘new knowledge-based economies’ 
what is wanted are workers with creative abilities, people ‘who can adapt, see 
connections, innovate, communicate and work with others’.xxxi
 
Robinson subsequently built on the arguments of All Our Futures, moving the focus to ‘a 
broader and longer view of creativity in business and in education’.xxxii The argument is 
both socially inclusive and market-orientated and links strongly to the government’s 
competitiveness agenda. Maintaining that ‘everyone has creative capacities’, Robinson’s 
interest lies in how these become ‘the greatest resource available to an organisation’ and 
in how a ‘systematic strategy to generate a culture of innovation across the whole 
organisation’ might be pursued.xxxiii  
 
For Robinson, creativity in corporate settings means fostering ‘an atmosphere where risk-
taking and experimentation are encouraged rather than stifled’. Like Cox, Robinson 
argues that ‘Corporate creativity should be understood as a systemic function of the 
organisation…A strategy to promote corporate creativity and innovation should engage 
all areas of the organisation’.xxxiv  
 
Robinson advocates interdisciplinarity, overcoming departmental boundaries, mixing 
different kinds of knowledge and expertise, and loosening up hierarchies. All of this 
implies a cultural change ‘where creative abilities are valued and harnessed to the 
organisational objectives’.xxxv In turn, this requires open-mindedness to experimentation 
and play and a refusal to be governed by short-termism and the bottom line. Change in 
companies’ and public organisations’ cultures presupposes changes ‘upstream’ in the 
education system, not least recognition of the effects of the categorical systems used in 
schooling. ‘Creativity depends on interactions between thinking and feeling, and across 
different disciplinary boundaries and fields of ideas. New curricula must be evolved 
which are more permeable and which encourage a better balance between generative 
thinking and critical thinking in all modes of understanding’.xxxvi We have to move 
beyond linear rationalism, Robinson believes, and develop a new ecology of human 
resources. 
 
Robinson’s thinking has been influential. Over 100,000 copies of the summary Of All 
Our Futures were distributed. His ideas have set the context for the Creative Partnerships 
programme, officially described as ‘the Government’s flagship creativity project for 
schools and young people’, which has focused on English schools in selected deprived 
areas. Established in 2002, this is funded by the DfES and the DCMS and managed by 
Arts Council England. This programme has spawned its own meta-discourse on what 
constitutes creativity.xxxvii The emergent doctrine of educational creativity has influenced 
ideas about how young people might be harnessed to the creative economy. It has led to 
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yet another report, Nurturing Creativity in Young People, published in July 2006 and 
commissioned by the DCMS and the DfES.xxxviii
 
This took its cue from James Purnell who, as Minister for Creative Industries, spoke at an 
Institute for Public Policy Research conference in June 2005. As cited in the report’s 
preface, he proposed that the UK become the ‘world’s creative hub’ and asked ‘what 
more we can do to nurture young creative talent’ in the educational system, suggesting 
that work was needed on ‘a clear set of assumptions which will help to inform the basis 
of our future policy on creativity’.  
 
Paul Roberts, Director of Strategy for the Improvement and Development Agency, 
authored Nurturing Creativity. The report constructs a highly self-referential universe. 
For instance, its section on ‘new pathways to creative industries’ is based on the Cox 
Review’s call for UK business to become more competitive. This part was written by 
Tom Bewick, Chief Executive of Cultural and Creative Skills, the sector skills council set 
up to develop training and business skills in a wide range of creative industries. Bewick 
proposes an apprenticeship model and other ways of linking secondary qualifications to 
the market place but notes the lack of ‘a support infrastructure in which creative careers 
can be enhanced or sustained over the long term’.xxxix
 
The report also bases itself on the DCMS’s original definition of the creative industries, 
cited above, and its conception of creativity is taken directly from Robinson’s 1999 
report. Key proposals include developing a ‘personal portfolio – a creative portfolio – 
incorporating both formal and informal learning, with the learner at the centre. 
Established by peer review, hosted and promoted by the Creative Industries (sic), 
physical or virtual in form, it would support personalised learning, assessment for 
learning and routes into the Creativity (sic) sector’.xl Charles Leadbeater (a noted guru of 
the creative economy and adviser to the Blair government) contributed the section on the 
creative portfolio. 
 
Recognition of the range of activities undertaken by young people outside school was 
connected to a comprehensive set of proposals for embedding creative activity into 
schoolwork, partnerships with practitioners, pathways to the creative industries and 
changes in frameworks and regulation to reinforce this shift.  
 
The Creative Economy Programme 
My third, and last, example concerns the Creative Economy Programme, a series of 
investigations and reports conducted under the aegis of the DCMS. Government interest 
was first signalled by a conference on the theme in London launched by the Secretary of 
State for Culture, Media and Sport, Tessa Jowell, in October 2005. Jowell used the 
occasion to generalise - for the EU as a whole  - an argument already exceedingly 
familiar in the UK. Noting the global competition faced by the EU, especially that 
coming from China and India, Jowell set out the line echoed only a couple of months 
later in the Cox Review: 
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‘We need to concentrate our efforts on where our strengths lie – in adding value through 
innovation and creativity…If we don’t increase our pace of innovation and investment, it 
will only be a matter of time before Europe’s position in the global economy is 
surpassed…Every industry must look to become a creative industry, in the broadest sense 
of the word.’xli
 
In November 2005, the DCMS launched the Creative Economy Programme, setting up 
seven working groups. Their composition reflected established practice throughout the 
development of creative industries policy of relying on a relatively small coterie of 
advisers. Industry observers believed that the groups were too dominated by public sector 
bodies and agencies.xlii  
 
The Creative Industries Programme (CEP), was described by a DCMS press release 
issued on 9 August 2006 as ‘the first step in achieving our goal of making the UK the 
world’s creative hub’. Its central purpose has been to raise consciousness and assess the 
value of public systems and programmes. Each working group produced a report. The 
designated areas were: infrastructure; competition and intellectual property; access to 
finance and business support; education and skills; diversity; technology; evidence and 
analysis. The CEP has gone through two phases and (at this time of writing) the DCMS 
intends to publish a Green Paper in June 2007. 
 
Given the limited space available, I shall illustrate current thinking with two examples, 
drawing on the reports of the Infrastructure Working Group and the Evidence and 
Analysis Group. 
 
In the discussion of infrastructure, ideas first mooted in the 1970s and 1980s made a 
comeback but in a different context. The keywords are ‘global competitiveness’ (an 
orientation to the world economy), ‘convergence’ (making links across separate activities 
and boundaries) and ‘stimulation’.xliii The latter idea refers to the development of  ‘core 
cities’ – once a nostrum at the heart of municipal cultural policy in an earlier era of 
Labour Party thinking.xliv ‘Creative hubs’ have replaced ‘clusters’ as the ‘in’ phrase but 
the fundamental idea is the same. Both underline the ‘significance of place as the main 
driver of creativity in the UK’.xlv London and the South East are seen as the key locus to 
which all other creative centres need to be more effectively linked. Competition with the 
BRIC countries – repeatedly signalled by Gordon Brown and other ministers – is 
presented as the spur to action. The UK ‘needs to reposition itself as the knowledge 
broker of the global creative economy’.xlvi Indeed, to achieve global recognition, 
London’s initiation of a World Creative Economy Forum is bruited. 
 
To bring together the necessary capabilities, a rationalising structure is required – 
namely the so-called ‘Creative Grid’, described early on as the group’s key 
recommendation. This has three elements. First, it draws together ‘web-based 
intelligence’ on the entire UK creative industries scene. Second, to secure the strategic 
goals for culture and creativity in the policy machinery, a ‘cross-departmental creativity 
working group’ is needed in government along with a ‘core cities creativity working 
group’. And third, a policy of ‘developing a creative milieu in creative places’ is 
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advocated (which is highly redolent of the Cox Review). Ensuring ‘a ready supply of 
talent’ and acting as the ‘world’s creative broker’ are additional actions proposed, as is 
ensuring that the various spaces that nurture creativity interact with the agencies that 
might facilitate development of the creative economy.xlvii  
 
Here is a familiar mix of solutions mostly in play for the past two decades. Other working 
group reports focused on the need to reform business practices, cross-refer to the Roberts 
report, and emphasise the importance of skills development. 
 
New Labour has incessantly proclaimed the importance of ‘evidence-led policy’. 
Consequently, the Evidence and Analysis Group’s work is of particular interest as it 
reflects government’s attempt to assess its own needs for credible data. Creative 
industries policy has not been able to draw on reliable official sources.xlviii It has taken 
almost a decade to acknowledge openly that the DCMS’s mapping documents have 
lacked adequate detail for a creative industries policy.xlix
 
The DCMS has tried to conceptualise the creative economy during the course of the CEP. 
In a first pass, ‘production’, ‘services’ and ‘arts and crafts’ were each distinguished as 
groupings within the creative industries with their own characteristics, although overlaps 
were recognised.l And then, in the run-up to publication of the Green Paper, further 
rethinking occurred. The creative economy was next envisaged as constituted by four 
concentric circles.li Moving from the centre to the periphery these were labelled as 
follows. First, core cultural fields with commercial outputs possessed of a ‘high degree of 
expressive value’ (such as painting and theatre) that invoke copyright protection. Second, 
cultural industries such as film, publishing, music and video games that involve ‘the 
mass reproduction of expressive outputs’ and are based on copyright. Third, creative 
industries and activities (such as design and software) for which ‘the use of expressive 
value’ is essential, as is the performance of the wider economy. And fourth, there is the 
rest of the economy, which is ‘dependent on the expressive outputs generated by’ the 
inner circles, for instance, the design of the Lexus or the iPod. The re-entry of the 
‘cultural industries’ into government discourse is noteworthy. 
 
The conception of the economy outlined above connects ideas about creativity in the 
global economy as a necessary attribute both of competitive businesses and of an 
educated workforce. 
 
Taking one’s distance 
This report has sought to demonstrate how several distinct objects of policy have become 
interrelated by the emergent doctrine of creativity. In addition to this, I have sought to 
show how, as policy thinking unrolls and the machinery of government gathers up wider 
circles of adherents by involving them in consultations or in conscripting them to the 
cause, the system of ideas has gained further currency and has become more fully 
elaborated. If the doctrine has undergone refinements, these have been conducted from 
within the tent. 
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Few voices are presently being raised in public even in mild criticism (although our 
initial fieldwork has suggested that some of the key actors in the sector well understand 
the expedient nature of needing to sign up to creativity as a mobilising clarion-call). A 
dissenting note has been sounded by Professor Geoffrey Crossick, Warden of Goldsmiths 
College London, a creative arts university. Crossick was the Chief Executive of the Arts 
and Humanities Research Council (AHRC), and brought its predecessor body into the 
UK government’s overall science policy apparatus. With this change of status, the arts 
and humanities became more explicitly governed by ideas of ‘knowledge transfer’ – and 
closer to the priorities of the science policy machinery - than before. Crossick, against 
this current, has argued that a simplistic and uniform model of knowledge transfer has 
been imposed on how universities relate to businesses. What is needed, he suggests, are 
not models for ‘knowledge transfer’ but rather proper recognition of how creative 
networks operate and how knowledge generation is not linear. Instead of knowledge 
transfer, we need  ‘spaces in which something can happen’.lii
 
Whatever his reservations, Crossick does not disavow the language of creative industries. 
Rather he replaces the top-down attempt to regulate and manage the conditions for 
creativity with the liberal-romantic idea of a happening-space. Such circumscribed 
dissent shows that it remains exceedingly difficult to escape the tentacular embrace of 
current doctrine and this compulsion the underlines the need to produce a radical critique 
of the origins and impact of the discourse of creativity. Two financial journalists, Larry 
Elliott and Dan Atkinson, have made a vigorous start. Britain, they argue, is being 
deluded by ‘top-notch exponents’ of ‘bullshit’ about the significance of the creative 
industries. The size of the ‘knowledge economy’ has been inflated and hyped. Key 
industries – film, television, music, and games – have lost ground in global competition. 
The scale of employment in the creative industries has been overblown. In their refusal to 
take claims about the creative industries seriously, they combine economic argument with 
a blunt dismissal of ‘government propaganda’.liii However, others have undoubtedly 
absorbed the government’s line and this has practical implications. 
 
That is because the doctrine of creativity is now an animating ideology for the so-called 
digital age. The Creative Economy Programme may be seen as a the latest attempt to 
rationalise inter-departmental cooperation, to make effective the flow of business 
intelligence, to encourage networking, to bring together dispersed creative clusters and to 
foster talent. All of this is geared – in the approved lingo - to making the UK a global 
creative broker. 
 
Of particular interest for my own research is in what form ideas about creativity and 
innovation become organisationally embedded and to what extent they shape the actual 
management of creative practice. Several distinct elements need to be analysed and 
related. Amongst these are first, the broad sweep of policy thinking and its origins; 
second, the new solutions offered by policy-makers as they encounter obstacles; and 
third, how ideas about creativity are actually interpreted in the practice of production. 
 
As the work proceeds, the aim is to analyse this process by focusing on two key 
organisations operating in the broadcasting and film sectors whose strategies are 
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differently framed by government policy - namely, the BBC and the UK Film Council.liv  
Initial findings suggest that the doctrine of creativity is open to – what shall we say? - 
creative interpretation. 
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